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INTRODUCTION
The presidents and boards of United Way 1 and Adelphi
Universitl acted in manners which indicated that they either
did not care or did not know the fiduciary standards which they
needed to exercise. President William Aramony of the United
Way of America spent the time of his tenure from 1970
through 1992 at this not-for-profit enterprise using its funds
and resources in many cases for his own personal benefit. He
appointed board members who were his friends, rewarded
family members with jobs, rented limousines, took transatlantic
flights and awarded contracts with scant thought of benefit to
United Way.
Adelphi University's president, Peter
Diamandopoulos, in like manner, ruled the governing board of
this not-for-profit entity during his tenure from 1985 through
1995. He misappropriated funds and lavished expenditures
upon himself.
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University, New York
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Oftentimes the officers and boards of not-for-profit
corporations 'believe that the standards of
required of them do not exact the same standards reqmred of
for-profit corporations. This paper emphasizes the fact
the
not-for-profit corporation statutes of many states reqmre the
same standards of care, loyalty and obedience to law
of the officers and boards of for-profit corporations. The
legislation of many states, in fact, repeats the same words in
each statute, whether applicable to not-for-profit or for-profit
. .
4
enttttes.
THE DUTIES OF GOOD FAITH, DILIGENCE, CARE AND
SKILL
General Duties
Every officer and director of a not-for-profit
must exercise the good faith, diligence, care and sk1ll reqmred
of any ordinarily prudent person in like position under similar
circumstances.
The officer and director must actively
participate in organizational meetings, evaluate reports, read
minutes and review the work of those for whom they are
5
responsible.
Protection of the Business Judgment Rule
Officers and directors of for-profit entities may rely upon
good
the expertise of others to make a reasoned,
faith uninterested and informed business judgment. Th1s same
standard of care applies to officers and directors of not-forprofit entities.
The officers and directors protect themselves through the
exercise of the business judgment rule by practicing restraint
and being diligent in avoiding hasty decisions. They
question and probe the information obtained from experts m
order to assure themselves the presentations made to officers
and board are accurate and sufficiently researched. This
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deliberation will evidence the good faith and reasonableness of
the officer and board decision. The minutes will accurately
describe the record of the decisional process indicating the
fairness of consideration paid and future effects of the decision
upon the enhancement of the corporation. 6
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, for example, upheld the
use and protection of the business judgment rule in Janssen v.
Best & Flanagan, decided on May 22, 2003. 7 George Janssen
and others, members of the Minneapolis Police Relief
Association (MPRA), brought a derivative action on behalf of
the MPRA against the attorneys for the corporation, Best &
Flanagan.
The plaintiffs alleged that the corporation' s
attorneys committed malpractice by improvidently and
improperly counseling MPRA to invest in a company known as
Technimar. The venture lost approximately $15 million for
MPRA.
MPRA was a not-for-profit corporation that administered a
Minneapolis police officer's pension plan. It was subject to the
Minnesota Non-profit Corporation Act and was governed by a
board of directors. Janssen and the other plaintiffs needed
MPRA to join in the suit, but special counsel hired by MPRA
to investigate Janssen's claims determined that the association
should not join the suit.
The Minnesota Supreme Court decided that the special
counsel could certainly act as a special litigation committee of
the association. The directors could reasonably rely upon that
special counsel's decision that the attorneys for the board has
not committed malpractice and that the board should not vote
to join the association in the suit. But the Court decided that
the directors did not reasonably act in reliance upon the special
counsel's decision. That counsel, Robert A. Murnane, had
never interviewed the plaintiffs or their attorneys, which he
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should have done as a fundamental obligation in reaching a
prudent decision about the reasonableness of their complaints.
Murnane also gave no indication that he had
undertaken the careful consideration of all the germane
benefits and detriments to MPRA that is indicative of a
good faith business decision. Murnane opined that
'the totality of the materials reviewed does not support
a finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal
malpractice in its handling of the MPRA affairs,' and
that 'to spend money in the pursuit of a legal
malpractice claim against Best & Flanagan would not
be prudent use of the MPRA funds.' The language of
his conclusion hints that his decision was that of a
special counsel evaluating the likelihood of a legal
victory. But a much more comprehensive weighing
and balancing of factors is expected in situations like
this, taking into consideration how joining or quashing
the lawsuit could affect MPRA 's economic health,
relations between the board of directors and members,
MPRA's public relations, and other factors common to
8
reasoned business decisions.

The Court, therefore, held the directors liable for their
failure of diligence, care, and skill.

Directors' Duties to Participate Actively in Board Action
Directors must also actively participate in assigned board
and committee obligations, indicate written dissent from any
board actions, have general knowledge of the books and
records of the corporation and investigate reports or warnings
of employee malfeasance.
Directors, in like manner, should ascertain the clear stated
process for fundraising, the payment of professional fees and
compensation and review for officers and employees. They
must examine the monthly financial accounts and reports made
available to board committees such as finance and audit. The
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directors must compare actual expenditures to budgetary
allocations, requiring an explanation of any discrepancies.
They need to actively participate in risk assessment and
strategic planning in order to initiate safeguards and controls
through insurance and fidelity bonds. It is vitally important
that the directors secure background checks for prospective
employees,
retain
corporate
records
and
protect
whistleblowers. Equal opportunity for service should appear
not only in the board but also in hiring practices.

An Egregious Failure to Actively and Diligently Participate in
Board Actions: A 2005 decision of the Commonwealth Court
of Pennsylvania, illustrates a failure of directors ' duties to
actively and diligently participate in board deliberations,
particularly concerning matters of discriminatory practices in
employee relations.
In Spanish Council of York, Inc. d/b/a York Spanish
American Center v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Commission 9, the York Spanish American Center (Center)
Executive Director, Vilma Garcia-Jones, began her duties in
1992 and served with its Assistant Director, Sterling Feeser,
until their discharge in 1996. Feeser was responsible for
supervising the Center program's effectiveness. He managed
staff and assisted in fundraising. He sent a letter to staff noting
certain
performance
shortcomings
and
suggested
improvements; the letter did not identify specific employees,
but a month later, he sent a warning letter to one of the
employees for failure to manage her monthly hourly quota of
cases as required by the Center's contract with York County.
This employee complained about the letter to her brother-inlaw, a member of the Center's board of directors. The
Executive Director also received complaints about Feeser's
strictness but she dismissed them, after investigation, as
lacking merit.
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Center board members then began to act individually and as
a group to hear complaints about
management s1?'le
without including either Assistant Director Feeser Exe.cutlve
Director Garcia-Jones in the meetings. The Executive Dtrector
informed board members that these meetings were not in
accord with specific Center grievance procedures for employee
complaints. Board members nonetheless
to hear the
complaints without informing Feeser of the situatiOn.
At an April 2, 1996 meeting of the board, the minutes
recorded a concern that Feeser "was not the best person to act
as director of the Center in the event of a vacancy in that
position." 10 Garcia-Jones, present at the meeting, indicated
that the board was violating the Center's employee handbook
by permitting individual meetings between
and board
members. She was "shouted down" when she mformed the
board that references to Feeser's ethnicity were inappropriate.
Although Feeser was fluent in Spanish and married to an
Hispanic woman, several board members suggested that
be eliminated because he was white. After the board meetmg,
staff members began using racial epithets toward Feeser; one
board member stated "he is not Latino, he is only married to a
· ,11
L atmo.
On April 23, 1996, the board called a special meeting. A
consultant, Dr. Jake Keller, was asked to evaluate the
relationships between board, administration and staff. The
but merely
report did not recommend discharging Mr:
suggested a new grant writer position. (This position, however,
was never advertised or filled.) The board, at the same
meeting, voted to eliminate Feeser's position and the board
president stated, "I needed to send a message to the staff that
[the board] had heard their complaints and had acted upon
them." 12 Feeser's position was eliminated effective June
1996. Garcia-Jones objected to the process and warned of Its
impropriety, both in accordance with the procedures in the
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employee handbook and in accord with the provisions of the
state's Human Rights law forbidding discrimination based on
race.
In September 1996, Feeser filed a complaint with the
Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission; eight days after the
complaint was served, the Center's board fired Garcia-Jones.
She subsequently filed her own complaint with the
Commission, asserting that her termination was prohibited
retaliation.
The Commonwealth Court decided that
discriminatory practices had occurred against both Feeser and
Garcia-Jones. The Court reasoned that board minutes, board
members' conduct and board actions indicated a desire to
discriminate on the basis of race and did not contain any
consistent or reasoned statement concerning Feeser's supposed
poor management style. Even if the Center had mixed motives,
the motive which predominated was that of racial
discrimination.
Both Feeser and Garcia-Jones properly
petitioned the Commission under the Act because they were (i)
protected, (ii) qualified, (iii) suffered adverse employment
action and (iv) were discharged in circumstances that inferred
prohibited discrimination. 13 Failure of the Center's board and
its members to follow basic guidelines of good faith, diligence,
care and skill resulted in serious deleterious effects upon a notfor-profit corporation whose laudable mission included the
fostering of citizenship and responsibility among the members
of the Latin-American community in York, Pennsylvania.
Heightened Internal Controls Required:
Recent
statutes
requiring additional diligence among board members and in
board action have resulted in heightened internal control.
Many not-for-profit corporations have prepared documents to
comply with the oversight, internal control and code for ethics
for financial professionals required of for-profit corporations
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 14 In order to comply with
the Act, these not-for-profit corporations are in the process of
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creating an active and aware audit committee. The Chief
Financial Officer and the Executive Director will publicly
attest to the accuracy, completeness and fairness of the
corporation's financial statements, to publicly disclose a code
of ethics for senior management and the governing board, to
have all audit work proved by the board audit committee and to
examine closely all insider loans. 15
THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
Officers and directors, if at all possible, should avoid
conflict of interests. The not-for-profit organization, however,
may enter a contract in which one of its directors has a material
financial interest. The interest, however, must be fully
disclosed to the board; the interested director must refrain from
voting; and the transaction must be reasonable and fair on its
face. Most boards, in fact, have instituted written policies
concerning the avoidance of conflicts of interest.
A not-for-profit corporation, furthermore, should refrain
from making corporate loans to directors, officers or their
families, even though the statutes permit such loans in the
reasonable expectation ofbenefit to the corporation.
Directors and officers, in like manner, should avoid
corporate opportunities, which divert a not-for-profit entity's
opportunities to personal gain of the director or officer. If the
opportunity is available or suitable to the corporation, the
officer or director may only take the opportunity if the
corporation, after due deliberation, decides not to take the
opportunity.
The duty of loyalty also requires directors and officers to
comply with the organization's articles of incorporation and
bylaws, its mission and purpose.
The duty of loyalty demands a curb upon self-dealing.
Officers and directors often experience difficulty in complying
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with this requirement. All of the cases cited above illustrate
forms of self-dealing, especially failure to comply with the notfor-profit organization's purpose and emoluments to directors,
officers and their families. Additional cases caution the board
member to exercise loyalty, honesty, and fidelity.
In particular, Fitzgerald v. The National Rifle Association of
16
America , describes a board's attempt to retain control over
board membership itself. The plaintiff Fitzgerald and others
petitioned the court to obtain an order requiring the defendant
National Rifle Association (NRA) to publish certain
advertising in its official journal, The American Rifleman,
concerning Fitzgerald's candidacy for the NRA's board of
directors. The District Court issued the order. It reasoned that
freedom of the press and the contractual statement on the
NRA's advertising rate card did not permit it to refuse the
advertisement because the fiduciary duty of corporate directors
includes the duty to ensure fair and open corporate elections.
The court indicated that this fiduciary duty extended only to
members of the organization which would include plaintiff
Fitzgerald.
The NRA was organized under the laws of the state ofNew
York pursuant to that state's not-for-profit corporation law. Its
directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to its stockholders,
in this case the Association's membership, to conduct its affairs
in good faith and to promote the best interests of the
Association. Officers and directors cannot manipulate the
affairs a corporation in order to obtain control for themselves
and not for another. The District Court cited Justice Douglas's
opinion in Pepper v. Litton:
He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve
himself first and his cestuis second. He cannot
manipulate the affairs of his corporation to their
detriment and in disregard of the standard of common
decency and honesty . . . He cannot use his powers for
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his own personal advantage and to the detriment of the
stockholders and creditors no matter how absolute in
terms that power may be and no matter how
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements. For
that power is at all times subject to the equitable
limitations that it may not be exercised for the
aggrandizement, preference, or advantage of the
17
fiduciary to the exclusion or detriment of the cestuis.
THE DUTY OF OBEDIENCE
The duty of loyalty to the organization's governing
documents is reinforced by the directors' and officers' duty to
obey those documents, including any corporate statement
concerning conflict of interest and disclosure.
18

Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.
reinforces the right of a not-for-profit cooperative governing
board to use its business judgment and to comply with its
cooperative apartment rules in order to enforce a "stop work"
order.
Tenant-shareholder Levandusky sought to install
heating riser pipes which arguably could create problems
elsewhere in the building's worn pipe system. The standard of
review which the Court of Appeals applied to this enforcement
of a building policy against a tenant-shareholder included both
the business judgment rule, which stated that the board
decision was reasonable in the circumstances. A concurring
opinion additionally indicated that the decision by the board
was certainly not arbitrary and capricious.
Under both
standards the cooperative board acted in accord with its
governing documents. Alleged personal dislike of the tenantshareholder by individual board members did not affect the
reasonableness of the decision. In the circumstances, no
evidence was adduced that the decision was arbitrary and
capricious.

Officers and directors, additionally, should familiarize
themselves with state and federal statutes concerning
solicitations for the not-for-profit's charitable purposes;
income, sales and use taxes; unemployment and worker's
compensation
duties;
tax
and
financial
reporting
responsibilities; and not-for-profit corporation obligations in
general to comply with statutory requirements.

St. Bartholomew's Church v. The City of New York and the
Landmarks Preservation Commission 19 clearly illustrates a notfor-profit board's necessity to comply not only with its internal
regulations but also with a local statute. The Court rejected the
claim of St. Bartholomew's that the decision of the Landmarks
Preservation
Commission
was
an
unconstitutional
impingement upon the Church's First Amendment free
exercise clause and establishment clause rights. The Court also
indicated that the property building restriction did not
constitute a government taking of property without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The Rector, Wardens, and Members of the Vestry of St.
Bartholomew's Church constituted its officers and directors.
They sought to amend a previous designation of the Church
and adjacent seven-story community house as a New York City
landmark in accordance with the Landmarks law. The Church
building would remain intact, but the community house would
be replaced by a forty-seven-story tower in order to adequately
meet the Church's purposes for its charitable programs.
The Court, however, agreed with the denial of any change in
status for the Church and its community house. The denial was
not a government regulation of religious beliefs as such; the
free exercise of religion does not relieve any individual, officer
or board from compliance with a valid neutral law of general
applicability. The Landmark law, furthermore, did not so
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seriously restrict the church's ability to use its property as to
constitute an unjust taking which would violate the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.

NPCL § 717. Duty of directors and officers
(a) Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of their respective
positions in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill
which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions. In the administration of the powers to
make and retain investments pursuant to section 512 (Investment
authority), to appropriate appreciation pursuant to section 513
(Administration of assets received for specific purposes), and to delegate
investment management of institutional funds pursuant to section 514
(Delegation of investment management), a governing board shall
consider among other relevant considerations the long and short term
needs of the corporation in carrying out its purposes, its present and
anticipated financial requirements, expected total return on its
investments, price level trends, and general economic conditions.

The officers and directors of St. Bartholomew's church,
therefore, were compelled to comply with a valid local statute.
CONCLUSION
Any practitioner who advises officers and directors of notfor-profit corporations must unequivocally state their duties to
be careful, diligent and faithful, to be loyal, and to be obedient.
The illustrative cases and statutes mentioned above vividly
require these officers and directors to use skills commensurate
with that of any ordinarily prudent person in like position under
similar circumstances.
Increasingly, these officers and
directors will need to practice the same standards of care,
loyalty and obedience to law required of the officers and board
members of for-profit organizations.

(b) In discharging their duties, directors and officers, when acting in
good faith, may rely on information, opinions, reports or statements
including financial statements and other fmancial data, in each case
prepared or presented by: ( 1) one or more officers or employees of the
corporation, whom the director believes to be reliable and competent in
the matters presented, (2) counsel, public accountants or other persons
as to matters which the directors or officers believe to be within such
person's professional or expert competence or (3) a committee of the
board upon which they do not serve, duly designated in accordance with
a provision of the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws, as to
matters within its designated authority, which committee the directors or
officers believe to merit confidence, so long as in so relying they shall
be acting in good faith and with that degree of care specified in
paragraph (a) of this section. Persons shall not be considered to be
acting in good faith if they have knowledge concerning the matter in
question that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted. Persons who
so perform their duties shall have no liability by reason of being or
having been directors or officers of the corporation.
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INTRODUCTION
The main stream media has been heralding a crisis in the
sub-prime mortgage sector. Newspaper and television reports
are replete with alarming news, leading viewers to believe that
the current crisis developed overnight. The purpose of this
paper will be to examine how this crisis is not an over-night
phenomenon, but the result of a series of decisions that took
place over a decade and which arose from a variety of factors
that some have compared to the banking problems of the
1930's. This paper will also examine the vast repercussions
these decisions have had on the entire U. S. economy, some of
which are already showing in the retail sector. Finally, we will
conclude with recent New York legislation meant to stave off
at least a part of this crisis by enacting consumer protection
legislation for purchasers of foreclosed properties ...
Overview of the Fiscal Crisis

One of the main culprits of the current financial crisis has
been the lending financial institutions themselves.
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